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I. Introduction
Water has always been a problem for California.  The blessing of a
Mediterranean climate carries with it the burden of supplying a burgeoning 
population from seasonal rains that fall in areas where extra freshwater is 
needed the least and are transported, at great expense, to areas where it is 
needed the most.  Historically, massive engineering projects have attempted 
to supply these needs with canals and dams.  But we are running out of 
rivers to dam and money to spend.  It is time to explore alternatives.  One of 
the most feasible and most neglected alternatives lies right under our feet. 
Effective management of California’s groundwater could make a major 
contribution to solving the State’s persistent water deficits.  
In 2009, the California Legislature revisited state water management. 
As state policy, it established the improvement of water conveyances and 
the expansion of statewide water storage.1  It set forth a mandate for 
planning for California’s strategic Delta, through which so much of the 
State’s water passes.  The Legislature also reaffirmed the allied doctrines of 
reasonable use and public trust as the foundations of California water 
policy.2 
Groundwater has long been the neglected stepchild in California’s 
complex system of water rights.  Even though it has become increasingly 
important as the State’s consumption grows along with its population, the 
Legislature and the regulatory agencies assigned the task of applying the 
constitutional and common law mandates of reasonable use and public 
trust have been restrained in exercising their powers.  However, a number of 
recent studies decrying the inability of regulations and regulators to cope 
realistically with these issues have focused new attention on the anomalies 
1. CAL. WATER CODE § 85020(f) (West).
2. Id. at § 85023 (West).
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of present law.3  Additionally, pending litigation over the Scott River in 
Northern California’s Siskiyou County4 provides a vehicle for reexamination 
of this neglected and oft-mismanaged resource. 
II. Water: The Commons and the Usufructuary Right
The nature of water and the law has plagued generations of
commentators, and still periodically arises to puzzle the courts.  The 18th 
century authority Blackstone stated that “water is a movable wandering 
thing, and must of necessity continue in common by the law of nature; so 
that I can only have a temporary, transient, usufructuary property 
therein . . . .”5  Unlike “Blackacre,” water cannot be held in fee simple, to the 
exclusion of others.  It has a frustrating way of evaporating into the sky, or 
escaping into the earth, for reuse in entirely different forms and places.  As a 
Colorado judge said:  
Each drop of water which for the moment, is part of a stream, is 
part of the whole earth.  It may at any time evaporate and 
become part of a cloud.  It may be snow in winter, hailing in 
spring, rain in summer, and part of a juicy melon in fall.  To apply 
to stream water medieval concepts derived from attempts to 
define unlimited fee simple title defies both reason and legal 
history.6 
His observation applies equally to groundwater, and California’s 
constitutional and trust protections apply equally to it as well. 
The uses of water extend well beyond agricultural irrigation and 
domestic consumption.  An Eden-like variety of plants, mammals and fish 
depend on it for their continued existence and evolution.  A myriad of 
provisions in California’s Constitution and state and federal statutes impose 
priorities and duties on its use, and common law trust and nuisance 
strictures inhibit it. 
3. M. RHEAD ENION, UNDER WATER: MONITORING AND REGULATING 
GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA, PRITZKER BRIEF NO. 1 (JULY, 2011); ELLEN  HANAK,
et al., PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, MANAGING CALIFORNIA’S WATER:
FROM CONFLICT TO RECONCILIATION (2011). 
4. Envtl. Law Found. et al. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-
2010-80000538 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010). 
5. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 14, 18, cited
in A. Rossman, M. Steele, Forging the New Water Law: Pub. Regulation of 
“Proprietary” Groundwater Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903 (1982). 
6. People v. Emmert, 597, P.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting). 
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Unlike fast lands,7 water is a common resource, subject to the common 
interest.  Ownerless in the traditional sense, its legal status has roots in 
ancient Roman law that was carried forth in civil law, expressed in the Los 
Siete Partidas of Alfonso the Wise and the Napoleonic Code.8  Although 
property rights can exist in water, they are commonly described as 
usufructory;9 in other words they only confer the right to the use of water, 
subject to strict limits imposed by the State Constitution, statute, and the 
public trust doctrine.  
The waste and unreasonable use of water has been proscribed since 
California’s Constitution was amended in 1928 to declare that all rights in 
water are limited to reasonable beneficial uses,10 and the courts have 
consistently held that these provisions apply to groundwater as well as 
other waters of the state.11  In 1983, the panoply of public interest 
protections was extended further.  The public trust doctrine, heretofore 
applied to protect public rights in the lands submerged by tides in navigable 
lakes and streams, was held to apply to diversions from the tributaries of 
navigable streams, at least to the extent that such diversions affected the 
navigable waters they fed. 12  Thus, California’s highest court held, all such 
uses are subject to the state’s continuing duty of supervision and may be 
modified when changing circumstances call for it under the doctrines of 
reasonable use and public trust.13  As an appellate court subsequently 
stated, “the concept that ‘water use entitlements are clearly and 
permanently defined,’ and are ‘neutral [and] rule-driven,’ is a pretense to be 
7. “Land that is above the high-water mark and that, when flooded by a
government project, is subjected to a governmental taking.  Owners of fast 
lands are entitled to just compensation for the taking.”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 955 (9th ed. 2009). 
8. Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes
the People’s Envtl. Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 195, 196-97 (1980); Joseph L. Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources. Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).  
9. Cal. Water Code section 102 states that all water is the property of
the people of the State, subject to appropriation. (West); see also, Eddy v. 
Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (explaining usufructuary nature of water 
rights). 
10. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
11. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367 (1935).
12. Phillips Petroleum v. State of Miss., 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
13. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983).
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discarded.  It is a fundamental truth . . . that ‘everything is in the process of 
changing or becoming’ in water law.”14  
III. Groundwater is Uniquely Unregulated
There is little doubt in the real world that groundwater is related to
surface water.  The runoff from rains and snow often penetrate the ground. 
Wells extracting water from the earth may affect the flow of surface streams. 
Nevertheless, California case law stubbornly adheres to an outmoded and 
initially mistaken notion that groundwater is somehow different, and the 
statutory permit scheme works on that assumption.  Accordingly, while 
surface waters are subject to extensive regulation to ensure their beneficial 
use, to prevent waste, and to safeguard public trust values, groundwater is 
consumed largely at the pleasure of an overlying owner.  One authoritative 
law review article characterized the current state of law as “the right to pump 
as much water as possible until one is sued.”15 
IV. Dividing the Waters by Legal Fictions
“One hesitates to plead for reforms in the name of common sense . . .
for we belong to a profession that prides itself on not throwing chaos lightly 
to the winds.”16  California law sets forth three categories for water: surface 
water, percolating groundwater, and subterranean streams flowing through 
known and definite channels.17  Only groundwater remains largely exempt 
from the state regulatory scheme.18  This is not due to lack of perception on 
the part of responsible entities.  As early as 1913, the California Water 
Commission, the body whose recommendations led to California’s permit 
system, stated that well considered statute laws should govern groundwater, 
but concluded the subject was “so vast that . . . [it had] neither the time nor 
14. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal.
App. 3d 548, 573 (1990) (quoting Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodations in 
Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1546-1547 (1989)). 
15. Eris L. Garner, Michelle Ouelette, Richard L. Sheraff, Jr., Institutional
Reforms in Cal. Groundwater Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021, 1022 (1994).  
16. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, COMMENT ON THE COURTS AND LAWMAKING, in LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 56 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed. 1959). 
17. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West); JOSEPH L. SAX, STATE WATER RES. 
CONTROL BD., NO. 0-076-300-0, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB’S 
PERMITTING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS
SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS, 
(Jan. 19, 2002). 
18. See ROBERT E. BECK & EDWARD W. CLYDE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS:
VOL. 5 SECTIONS 400-459, at 419  (Robert E. Clark ed. 1972). 
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the funds necessary to make a satisfactory investigation of it.”19  In 1957, the 
authors of the state water plan urged that the “effective administration of 
the development and utilization of ground water resources . . . will become 
mandatory as full water development is approached.”20  The National Water 
Commission similarly concluded that the treatment of surface and ground 
water should be integrated.21  However, in 1961 the Assembly Water 
Committee set the theme for decades of future regulation, or lack of it.  It 
stated “[w]ater agencies expressed a strong desire to solve their problems 
themselves and to manage ground water basins locally.  The committee 
agrees that local management is desirable and . . . provides simplified 
solutions to many of the ground water basin management problems.”22 
This policy showed itself when the next major effort at reform arose.  In 
1977, Governor Jerry Brown created a commission to review California water 
rights law.23  The commission found that “California’s groundwater is usually 
available to any pumper, public or private, who wants to extract it, 
regardless of the impact of extraction on neighboring groundwater pumpers 
or on the general community.”24  It recommended new statewide legislation 
calling for management at the local level,25 restricted to areas with long-term 
overdraft, subsidence or water quality problems.26  In those areas local 
management authorities would be empowered to invoke adjudications to 
define rights and control exports.27  Local authorities would be empowered 
to control the use of groundwater storage space in accordance with 
conjunctive use of ground and surface waters.28  If they failed to act or to 
meet specified standards, the State Water Resources Control Board 
(“SWRCB”) would designate a groundwater authority, which would develop 
19. CONSERVATION COMM’N OF THE STATE OF CAL., REPORT OF THE
CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 31 (1913). 
20. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES. DIV. OF RES. PLANNING, BULLETIN NO. 3: THE 
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 221 (1957). 
21. NWC, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 233 (1973). 
22. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE. ON WATER, CALIFORNIA. ASSEMBLY, 
ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE. REPORTS VOL. 26 NO. 4: GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS
IN CALIFORNIA 46 (1962). 
23. JERRY BROWN, EXEC. DEP’T OF THE STATE OF CAL., EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 
B-26-77 (1977).
24. GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, 
FINAL REPORT 136 (1978). 
25. Id. at 165-166.
26. Id. at 166.
27. Id. at 167-168.
28. Id. at 169.
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and implement a management program, including registration and licensing 
of all groundwater extraction.29  The plan was stillborn.  When these 
proposals were presented to the legislature, they failed in committee.30   
Today, the propensity to prefer local solutions remains alive and well. 
In April 2011, the Association of California Water Agencies (“ACWA”) 
published a groundwater study summarizing local efforts at groundwater 
management, which by then, were not inconsiderable if uneven, and 
strongly argued against another layer of regulation.31  However, groundwater 
management remains a problem.  In 2009, The Department of Water 
Resources (“DWR”) found that each year, on average, there was a 2 million 
acre feet overdraft from groundwater basins.32  The Legislature found the 
problems were getting worse, largely because California is the last western 
state without any state groundwater management–and has very little 
information about the condition of the state’s groundwater basins.  An 
analysis of Senate Bill 229 concluded:  
Excessive pumping has led to substantial subsidence, as much 
as 55 feet in some areas.  Recently . . . on the west side of the San 
Joaquin Valley, where allocations of Delta water from the federal 
Central Valley Project were minimal, farmers responded by 
pumping more groundwater.  Reports then surfaced that the 
State Water Project’s canal, which passes through the area on its 
way to Southern California, may suffer cracks because of the high 
level of pumping and resultant sloping of the ground under the 
canal.33 
29. Id. at 190-193.
30. The Los Angeles Times reported the bills were opposed by those
“who are against any semblance of state supervision on the use of 
underground water supplies.” Rossmann & M. Steel, Forging the New Water 
Law: Public Regulation of “Proprietary” Water Rights, 33 HASTINGS L. J. 903, 928-29, 
n.152 (1982); see J. Stevens, Instream Uses Twenty-Five Years Later: Incremental
Progress or Revolving Door? 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 393 (2005) (describing the
history of the groundwater proposals).
31. DANIELLE BLACET, TIM PARKER, & DAVIS ALADJEM, ASSOCIATION OF
CALIFORNIA WATER AGENCIES, SUSTAINABILITY FROM THE GROUND UP: GROUND-
WATER MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (2011). 
32. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN HIGHLIGHTS 7 (2009)
(“[o]verdraft is characterized by groundwater levels that decline over a 
period of years and never fully recover, even in wet years.”). 
33. PROPOSED CONFERENCE REP. NO. 1, SENATE BILL 229, ASSEMBLY WATER, 
PARKS & WILDLIFE COMMITTEE (Sept. 9, 2009) available at http://leg.info.legislat 
ure.ca.gov/faces/billtextclient.xhtm. 
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Nine years ago the State Water Resources Control Board, charged with 
implementing California’s water rights and water quality laws, 
commissioned Professor Joseph Sax of Berkeley Law to make a 
comprehensive study of the laws governing the Board’s permitting authority. 
He concluded that the tests in place for distinguishing groundwater (exempt 
from permitting) and other forms of water (subject to permit or direct 
regulation and public trust review) are unsupportable and inconsistent with 
the constitutional mandate that all the waters of the state be put to 
reasonable and beneficial use and not wasted.34  His report was politely 
received and filed without further action.35  Since then, several other studies 
have concluded that logic and necessity call for the integrated treatment of 
ground and surface water.36  They have all gone unheeded. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, according to a 2007 report 
commissioned by Governor Schwarzenegger, the SWRCB has issued permits 
to divert water from the Sacramento San Joaquin Delta to less than a third of 
those currently assumed to be diverting.  The Delta Vision Plan developed 
from that study states California must develop and use comprehensive 
information on the local, regional and statewide availability, quality, use 
and management of groundwater and surface water resources to help 
improve opportunities for regional self-sufficiency.37  A statewide monitoring 
program was then proposed, requiring local groundwater managers to notify 
the Department of Water Resources as to what entity would monitor 
groundwater elevations.  In the absence of a local monitoring program, the 
Department could monitor elevations in critical basins, assessing a fee on 
well owners to recover costs.38  A version of this proposal was adopted, 
expressing legislative intent that “all groundwater basins and subbasins be 
regularly and systematically monitored locally and the resulting 
groundwater information be made readily and widely available.”39 
34. SAX, supra note 17.  Professor Sax’s conclusions, while disregarded
by the water board, found their way into a law review article.  Joseph L. Sax, 
We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269 
(2003). This progression brings to mind Mark Twain’s admonition against 
getting into disputes with anyone (an editor in Twain’s case, a professor in 
Sax’s) who has access to ink by the barrel. 
35. Id.
36. E.g., HANAK, supra note 3; CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
CALIFORNIA’S WATER: AN LAO PRIMER 69-70 (2008). 
37. GOVERNOR’S DELTA BLUE RIBBON TASK FORCE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
RESERVE AGENCY, DELTA VISION: OUR VISION FOR THE CALIFORNIA DELTA (2008). 
38. S.B. 229, PROPOSED CONFERENCE  REPORT NO. 1 (2009), supra note 33.
39. CAL. WATER CODE § 10920 (West).
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V. Judicial and Legislative Approaches
Despite a tradition of reluctance, excesses arising from the wild west
nature of groundwater mining have led to some responses from courts and 
the Legislature.  It became clear early in California’s history that unlimited 
pumping, without regard to its effects on neighbors or the environment, 
could not be tolerated.  A number of judicially created doctrines were 
fashioned to curb its abuse.  At the same time, the legislature has acted to 
improve monitoring, by authorizing groundwater management mechanisms 
for agriculture as well as urban uses, to ensure the collection of data on its 
extraction and to head off developments lacking an adequate water supply. 
In addition, a wide range of financial measures has been enacted to coax 
local entities to take specified measures.40  Whether this mixture of hortatory 
measures, data gathering, financial inducement and planning mandates will 
meet the demands of the Constitution and public trust doctrine remains to 
be seen. 
A. The Courts Deal with the Problem
Under the English common law rule adopted by California in 1850, an 
overlying landowner had an unlimited right to extract groundwater water 
without regard to its effect on his neighbors.41  The legal distinction between 
groundwater (essentially unregulated) and surface water subject to 
appropriation (regulated by permit) arose originally in California case law.42  
It is now based on California Water Code sections 1200-1201, defining water 
subject to appropriation as “[a]ll water flowing in any natural channel” 
except for water needed for use on riparian land or otherwise appropriated. 
Such waters are limited to “surface water, and to subterranean streams 
flowing through known and definite channels.”43  These waters are defined as 
follows by the SWRCB to determine its permitting authority:  
1. Is there a subsurface channel?
2. Does the channel have relatively impermeable bed and banks?
3. Is its course known or capable of being known by reasonable
inference?
4. Is groundwater flowing in the channel?44
40. E.g., BLACET, supra note 31, at 19-20.
41. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303 (1871); Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255
(1886); see also SAX, supra note 17, at 14-26 (discussing related California 
cases).  
42. SAX, supra note 17, at 14.
43. CAL. WATER CODE.§ 1200 (West).
44. N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App.
4th 1577, 1585-86 (2006); SAX, supra note 17, at 5-10.  
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This test, based on the recommendations of the Water Commission in 1913, 
came from the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Los Angeles v. Pomeroy,45 
which held that underflow of the Los Angeles River should be considered 
part of the stream for purposes of the city’s pueblo water rights.46  However 
the assumption of absolute ownership in Pomeroy was rejected only four 
years later in Katz v. Wilkenshaw47 in which the court essentially held that an 
overlying landowner pumping groundwater must respect the rights of others 
affected.48  Six years later the court reemphasized the point, stating “[t]here 
is no rational ground for any distinction between . . . percolating waters and 
the waters in the gravels immediately beneath and directly supporting the 
surface flow, and no reason for applying a different rule to the two 
classes . . . if, indeed, the two classes can be distinguished at all.”49 
A series of decisions reflect this approach, limiting the absolute nature 
of the common law rule:  
Correlative Rights.  In the 1903 Katz v. Wilkenshaw decision the state’s 
supreme court rejected the English common law rule permitting overlying 
landowners to extract water without consideration of the effects on their 
neighbors.50  Holding that a reasonable use test should apply, the court held 
that overlying landowners have “correlative rights” to a reasonable amount 
of water applied to reasonable and beneficial uses.51  Where the supply is 
insufficient for all, each is to receive a “fair and just proportion.”52  
Additionally, any water surplus to the needs of these landowners could be 
appropriated by others.53  This early effort by the court to impose some 
degree of reasonableness on groundwater extraction gained new life when, 
in 1928, the State Constitution was amended to impose the reasonable and 
beneficial use test on all the waters of the state.  This provision applies to 
45. 124 Cal. 597 (1899) writ of error dis. sub. nom.
46. See SAX, supra note 17, at 14-20.
47. 141 Cal. 116 (1903).
48. Justice Lucien Shaw, author of the opinion, later stated that Katz
“establishes a rule with respect to waters percolating in the soil, which 
makes it to a large extent immaterial whether the waters in this land were or 
were not part of an underground stream, provided...that their extraction 
from the ground diminished to that extent, or to some substantial extent, 
the waters flowing in the stream.”  McClintock v. Hudson, 141 Cal. 275, 281 
(1903); see also SAX, supra note 17, at 21-23.   
49. Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 628 (1909).
50. 141 Cal. 116, 150 (1903).
51. Id. at 136.
52. Id.
53. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 15 (1921); see
generally Katz v. Wilkenshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1903). 
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groundwater, thus furnishing a basis for regulating its pumping not yet fully 
realized.54  
Non-Overlying Uses.  Where there is a surplus of groundwater, courts 
have held that the surplus may be used by appropriators on more distant 
lands, subject to the priorities of prior appropriations.55  However, the courts 
have zealously protected the rights of overlying owners by holding that their 
prospective uses may not be limited in disregard of such rights.56  
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court recently noted that “at least in 
theory” a landowner’s future overlying uses could be reduced to prevent 
“unreasonable or wasteful usage.”57 
Prescription.  Prescriptive rights may be acquired by an appropriative 
taking of water that is not surplus if the use is “actual, open and notorious, 
hostile and adverse to the original owner, continuous and uninterrupted for 
the statutory period of five years, and under claim of right.”58  
The Nuisance Doctrine.  It prohibits the use of water so as to damage 
another’s property or that of the public at large.  California courts have been 
willing to apply the nuisance doctrine to protect the State’s water for many 
years.  In 1884 the Supreme Court applied it to enjoin upstream hydraulic 
miners from letting their debris fill the banks of the Sacramento River, 
causing flooding and destroying its navigability.59  Once again the rationale 
of National Audubon should apply: whether a public trust water is impaired by 
the deposit of debris or the diversion of its waters.60  The same rationale 
applies when the State’s interest in fisheries is violated by water diversions 
or pollution.61 
Basin Wide Adjudication.  The courts may determine the rights of all 
overlying landowners within a particular basin and in the process designate 
54. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, at 366-67 (1935).
55. See Katz v. Wilkenshaw, 141 Cal. at 135-36; see also City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Bernardino, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 277-78 (1975); see generally, 
WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 431, 436-41 (1956).   
56. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1234 (2000).
57. Id. at 1249 n. 13.
58. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926-27 (1949).
59. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138 (1884); see also
People ex. rel. v. Russ,  132 Cal. 102 (1901) (finding obstruction in slough 
adjoining navigable stream). 
60. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 436-37 (1983);
Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L.REV. 233, 257-258 (1980).    
61. People v. Glenn Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30, 34-35, 38
(1932) (finding that an unscreened diversion was killing fish). 
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the Water Board to act as referee.62  And the Board itself may institute a 
basin wide adjudication to prevent the destruction or irreparable injury to 
groundwater resources.63  However, the Supreme Court has held that the 
priorities of water right holders in the basin must be respected.  Thus, 
overdraft of a groundwater basin per se would not justify a rearrangement of 
priorities.  A priority-based allocation could be changed only where the 
pumper’s individual use of water was shown to be unreasonable or 
wasteful.64  Because of its expense and complexity the adjudication is not a 
favored remedy. 
The Public Trust Doctrine.  The states hold the beds and banks of their 
navigable waters in trust for their people, historically for purposes of 
commerce, navigation and fisheries.  This doctrine has been characterized as 
an inherent attribute of state sovereignty.65  It limits the purposes for which 
these trust resources may be used, and severely restrains the power of states 
to dispose of them or use them for non-trust purposes.66  
Historically, the public trust had been limited to commercially 
navigable waterways but over the past two centuries a convergence of legal 
developments led to its application to water and water rights: 
1. The public trust was applied to protect navigable waters from
impairment by upstream acts such as hydraulic mining resulting in the 
deposits of debris impairing their usefulness for trust purposes.67  Then 
over a hundred years later, the California Supreme Court concluded 
that if upstream activities resulting in harm to trust waters by virtue of 
62. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000, 2001 (West); see City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000); see also E. Garner and J. Willis, Right 
Back Where We Started From; The Last Twenty-Five Years of  Groundwater Law in 
California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 413 (2005).   
63. CAL. WATER CODE § 2100 (West).
64. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000).
65. Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363 (1977); Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 
41 U.S. 367 (1842).  The public trust is commonly traced back to Roman law. 
The Justinian code states that certain things such as “the air, the running 
water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea” were incapable of 
private ownership.  THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.2.2 (T.Cooper trans. ed. 
1841).  
66. See generally, J. Stevens, The Public Trust, supra note 8.
67. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138 (1884); People
ex. rel. v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102 (1901) (damming sloughs affected navigable 
river). 
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deposits of sediment should be prohibited, so should diversions having 
equally detrimental effects.68   
2. Protected trust purposes were extended to wildlife, recreation
and recreation.  In the 19th century, the trust was mainly applied to 
commerce, navigation and fisheries.  But in 1971, the California court 
held that:  
In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an 
outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over 
another.  [citation]There is a growing public recognition that one 
of the most important public uses of the tidelands–a use 
encompassed within the tidelands trust–is the preservation of 
those lands in their natural state, so they may serve as ecological 
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments 
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and 
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.69 
3. The trust was held to encompass non-tidal waters.  For many
years it was contended that the public trust extended only to tidal 
waters because the English common law rule was so limited.  However 
the California court, in accord with others, held such a restriction 
made no sense in the vast non-tidal waters of this country and 
therefore California’s extensive lakes and rivers enjoyed its 
protection.70 
In the National Audubon case, the California Supreme Court dealt with 
what it saw as a “collision course” between water rights law and the public 
trust.71  At issue were diversions of water from tributaries of Mono Lake by 
Los Angeles under long held water rights permits.  Admittedly, these 
diversions were drawing down the Lake’s waters.  By 1970 diversions by Los 
Angeles had caused the lake level to drop 45 feet, reducing its volume by 
more than one half and doubling its salinity level.  The traditional water 
rights system could provide no relief.  Although protests had been made in 
68. “If the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy
navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should equally 
apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys navigation and other 
public interests.  Both actions result in the same damage to the public 
interest.” Nat’l Audubon Society v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 436-37 (1983) 
(emphasis added). 
69. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 259-260 (1971).
70. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892); State v. Super. Ct.
(Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210 (1981); State v. Super. Ct. (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240 
(1981). 
71. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 425.
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the 1940’s that the city’s diversions would harm fishery and other trust 
resources, the state water board had concluded that it was powerless to take 
such factors into consideration.72  
In 1979, a group of environmental plaintiffs filed an action alleging 
that the city’s diversions were damaging public trust resources including 
wildlife, esthetic and recreational values in the basin.  The court agreed and 
made a number of important rulings significant to state water rights in 
general: 
1. The public trust applies to diversions from non-navigable tributaries
to navigable water bodies when they impair trust values in the navigable 
waters. 
2. The holders of water rights hold them subject to the public trust,
and can assert no vested right to use them in a manner harmful to the trust. 
3. The state as sovereign has continuing supervisory control over its
navigable waters.  This principle prevents any party from acquiring a vested 
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by 
the trust.  
4. The public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the
taking and use of appropriated water; a duty that includes the power to 
reconsider water allocations previously made, and to evaluate their effect on 
trust values. 
5. The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources and to protect 
public trust values whenever feasible.73  
In applying the public trust doctrine, the court invoked a panoply of 
protections developed through the years in dealing with the states’ duties as 
trustees: 
a) Public Trust Resources are Inalienable.  In a decision twice described by
the California court as the “primary authority” in the trust field,74 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Illinois legislature lacked the power to make an 
irrevocable grant of the submerged lands on the Chicago waterfront, stating 
“[t]he state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
72. Id. at 428; see also THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE–INSTREAM FLOWS AND
RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER POLICY CENTER (1980) (published in THE PUBLIC
TRUST AND THE WATERS OF THE AMERICAN WEST: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND
TOMORROW, LEWIS AND CLARK COLLEGE (1988)). 
73. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 437, 445-446; see generally, H.C.
Dunning, The Significance of California’s Public Trust Easement for California Water 
Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980).  
74. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 437 (quoting City of Berkeley v.
Super. Ct., 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (1980)). 
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people are interested than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of peace.”75 
The rationale for this was put eloquently by an Oregon court:  
Because the trust is for the public benefit, the State’s trustee 
obligation is commonly described as the protection of specified 
public usages, e.g., navigation, fishery and, in more recent cases, 
recreation.  The severe restriction upon the power of the State as 
trustee to modify water resources is predicated not only upon the 
importance of the public use of such waters and lands but upon 
the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of the resources and its 
fundamental importance to our society and to our environment. 
These resources, after all, can only be spent once.  Therefore, the 
law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and 
estuaries once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to 
the public and, accordingly, has required the highest degree of 
protection from the public trustee.76 
In National Audubon, however the court held that the trust protecting 
the state’s trust waters from diversions under established water rights 
provided more qualified protection, stating that the “Legislature may as a 
matter of current and historical necessity . . . authorize the diversion of water 
75. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  An even earlier New
Jersey decision disapproved the transfer of tidelands into private ownership. 
The property in such waters, the court held, was “vested in the sovereign, but 
. . . vested in him not for his own use, but for the use of the citizen, that is, 
for his direct and immediate enjoyment.  The legislature may not, the court 
stated, “consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of 
the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right.” 
That, the state’s Chief Justice said, would be a grievance, “which never could 
be long borne by a free people.”  Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).  This 
principle is rooted in medieval law.  The medieval scholar Henry Bracton 
rephrases Roman law, customarily cited as the basis for the trust, in terms of 
natural law: “By natural law, these are common to all: running water, the air, 
the sea, and the shores of the sea.”  He went on to say that such things that 
“relate to the public good cannot be given over or transferred...to another 
person, or separated from the Crown.”  2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968). 
76. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520 (1978), aff’d 590
P.2d 709 (1970).
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to distant parts of the state, even though unavoidable harm to trust uses at 
the source stream may result.”77 
b) The Public Trust Invokes a Rule of Statutory Construction Favoring the
Retention and Protection of Trust Resources.  Assuming that groundwater, like all 
the other state’s waters, is held in trust for the people of California, statutes 
purporting to abandon that trust are strictly construed to retain its 
protection where reasonably possible.  Intent to abandon the trust must be 
clearly expressed or necessarily implied.78  There is no indication in the 
statutory definition of groundwater or the permitting statutes that the 
legislature intended to extinguish the public trust in groundwater.  In 1957 
California’s highest court held that the people of California were the 
equitable owners of its water and that “the state may not therefore lawfully 
dispossess itself of the title to such water and may not surrender its control 
in any way inconsistent with the administration of the trust in which the title 
is held.”79  No effort has been made by the legislature to reverse or modify 
this holding if indeed such legislation would be constitutional.80 
c) Public Trust Actions May be Brought by Any Person.  The bugaboo of
standing is not available to restrain public trust actions.  Any citizen may 
bring such an action.81  
d) The Public Trust Applies to Wildlife, Non-Tidal Waters, and Waters Artificially
Enlarged.  The public trust is a pervasive and multi-faceted doctrine.  Initially 
applicable to the tidelands, then to the beds and banks of non-tidal 
navigable lakes and rivers,82 it was applied to diversions of waters affecting 
those water bodies by National Audubon, and to fish and game at an early 
77. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 446.
78. See generally, City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal. 3d 515 (1980);
People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576 (1913). 
79. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. All Parties, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 625-626 (1957)
(emphasis added), rev’d on other grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); but see 
Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist v. All Persons, 53 Cal. 2d 692 (1960) (describing trust 
language as dicta). 
80. See Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also, San Carlos
Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct., 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) (finding Legislature 
lacks power to extinguish trust in waters). 
81. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251 (1971); Envt’l Defense Fund, Inc. v.
East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. 26 Cal. 3d 183 (1980) (holding public interest 
organization may sue to enjoin unreasonable use of water as well as enforce 
trust).  
82. State v. Super. Ct. (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210 (1981); State v. Super. Ct.
(Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240 (1981). 
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stage of its history.83  It has been applied to artificially enlarged waters,84 and 
to streams only navigable for recreational purposes.85  In recent years it has 
been applied to the dry sand areas of beaches,86 and it has been used as the 
rationale for wetlands regulation.87   
VI. The Legislature Weighs In
True to the 1962 recommendations of the Assembly Water Committee,
the legislature has given local entities the most opportunities for 
groundwater regulation.88  Even though proposals for statewide regulation 
have been rejected, a number of them have responded with local schemes.89  
In addition, data collection has steadily increased.  In 2009, a special 
session of the Legislature reaffirmed Governor Schwarzenegger’s goal of a 
20% reduction in water consumption by 2020, established mandatory 
monitoring and required agricultural suppliers to adopt water management 
plans.  These and preexisting measures are summarized below: 
A. Monitoring
Effective groundwater monitoring is a necessary prerequisite to relief 
under either private or public action.  It was set as a state goal in 2009, 
although authority existed for a number of entities before that.90  The 2009 
83. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397 (1897); see People v.
Harbor Hut Rest., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1151 (1983) (“The ‘dominant theme’ of 
this state’s obligation as trustee (of its fisheries) is its duty to exercise 
continued supervision of the trust to prevent parties from using the trust in 
a harmful manner”); see also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1896), 
overruled on other grounds; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).   
84. Fogerty v. State, 187 Cal. App. 3d 224 (1986); PG&E v. Super. Ct.
(Shasta Cnty.), 145 Cal. App. 3d 253 (1983); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 
232 (Wis. 1969). 
85. E.g., People ex rel Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (1971); Nat’l
Audubon Society v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435 n. 17 (1983).  Of course, 
the obligations imposed by the trust may differ as its application does.  See 
Nat’l Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 446. 
86. Matthews v. Bay Head Improv. Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
87. Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
88. “Many water management decisions can best be made at a local or
regional level.”  CAL. WATER CODE. § 380(e) (West). 
89. See BLACET, supra note 31 at 13.
90. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10780, 10753.7 (West).
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legislation brought statewide mandatory groundwater monitoring to 
California for the first time.  California Water Code section 10920 was 
enacted, stating that all groundwater elevations should be regularly and 
systematically monitored locally, and the results be “readily and widely” 
available.”  The Department of Water Resources (DWR) is to exercise an 
advisory role and is empowered to step in to find suitable local entities to 
do the job if none readily volunteer.  Absent any willing local agencies, DWR 
may identify state and federal wells capable of providing sufficient 
information.  If that information is insufficient the Department may conduct 
monitoring itself.91 
B. Empowerment and Planning
Major urban water suppliers must adopt and periodically update a 
water management plan identifying and quantifying existing and planned 
sources of water in five-year increments, 20 years out.  If groundwater is 
identified as an existing or planned source of water, detailed information is 
required.92  
Legislation passed in 2009 calls for a 20% reduction in consumption 
and management “consistent with efficiency planning and implementation 
standards for both urban and agricultural suppliers.”93   
In addition a number of general laws grant local agencies limited 
authority over groundwater.  Thus groundwater replenishment districts and 
municipal water districts may institute proceedings to adjudicate water 
rights94 and water conservation districts may litigate water rights and require 
registration and monitoring of wells in order to impose groundwater use 
91. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10932, 10934 (West); The Department of Water
Resources may as a last resort engage in monitoring itself but it may not 
enter private property without the owner’s consent, require the submission 
of information, or impose fees for its work.  CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10933.5, 
10934 (West).  The restrictions on entry and submission of information apply 
as well to other entities .  Id. at § 10934.  For a discussion of the new 
requirements see Ronald Robie, see CAL. LEGISLATURE PASSES WATER BILL
PACKAGE, XLIII WATER LAW NEWSLETTER (Rocky Mtn. Mineral Law Found. 
2010); see also, Enion, supra note 3, at 13. 
92. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10620, 10631 (West).
93. Id. at § 10608.4 (West).
94. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 60222, 60230, 71757, 74641 (West).
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charges.95  In addition, uncodified special acts may grant groundwater 
regulation powers.96  
The state constitution empowers cities or counties to enact and 
enforce “all police, sanitary and other ordinances not in conflict with general 
laws.”97  In Baldwin v. County of Tehama98 the appellate court held that this 
provision authorized counties to place limits on the extraction of 
groundwater for export.  In addition, land use powers and general plan 
provisions provide opportunities for more extensive groundwater planning. 
C. Financial Inducements
The grant or withholding of state loans or grants can be used to induce 
compliance with state standards.  This device has been invoked to require 
urban and agricultural suppliers to comply with specific conservation 
standards.99  
D. Local Water Purveyors
California Water Code sections 10750-10753.9 authorize local agencies 
providing water service to adopt groundwater management plans. However, 
no such plan may be adopted if landowners holding more than 50% of the 
assessed valuation in the service area object.  Additionally, the area subject 
to the plan may not be eligible if it is already subject to groundwater 
management “pursuant to other provisions of law or a court order, 
judgment, or decree.”100  Finally, no limits can be imposed on groundwater 
extraction unless the agency determines, after study that groundwater 
replenishment or other sources of supply are insufficient or infeasible.101 
95. Id. at §§ 74641, 75540-75642 (West).
96. E.g., The Sacramento County Water Agency Act, Stats. 1985, ch.
848, Deering’s Wat.-Uncod, Acts, Act 6730(a) 342 (1970).  
97. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
98. 31 Cal.App.4th 166 (1994).
99. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 10608.56 (West); see also id. at §§ 7900 et seq.,
10795, 79000, 79500 et seq. (West); see BLACET, supra note 31, at 30. 
100. CAL. WATER CODE § 10753 (West).
101. Id. at § 10753.8(c) (West).
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E. Agricultural Water Suppliers
Agriculture, consuming 84% of the state’s water, has not avoided 
scrutiny.102  The Agricultural Water Management Planning Act, enacted in 
2009, reaffirms legislative intent that the “conservation of water shall be 
pursued actively to protect both the people . . . and the state’s water 
resources,” and that “conservation of agricultural water supplies shall be an 
important criterion in public decisions with regard to water.”103  Recent 
legislation declares the legislature’s intent that both urban and agricultural 
water suppliers be subject to a number of water use efficiency, planning, and 
implementation standards.104  It requires them to prepare agricultural water 
management plans and achieve conservation goals meeting specified 
standards.105  Suppliers providing more than 50,000 acre-feet annually for 
agricultural purposes must report on matters relating to water management 
and conservation practices.  All agricultural water suppliers must adopt an 
agricultural water management plan.106  Such plans must recognize fish, 
wildlife and other environmental values and recreational uses.107 
F. Endangered Species Acts
Otherwise lawful diversions may be restricted under the state or 
federal endangered species acts.108 
G. Public Ownership
Diversions of water causing injury to fisheries may be enjoined as a 
violation of the people’s interest.109 
102. Nevertheless, some experts remain unsatisfied with current
planning efforts;  E.g., Peter H. Gleick, Report Wrongly Excuses Farms From 
Helping Solve Water Woes, SAC. BEE, Mar. 6, 2011, at E5 (potential for 
agricultural water savings 10-15% or more). 
103. CAL. WATER CODE § 10802 (West).
104. Id. at § 10608.4 (West).
105. Id. at §§ 10802, 10826 (West).
106. CAL. WATER CODE § 10820(a).
107. CAL. WATER CODE § 10826 (West).
108. U.S. v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal.
1992); Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 8 Cal. 
App. 4th 1554, 1568-69 (1992); Sandra K. Dunn, Endangered Species Over Water 
Resources Development: The California Experience, 25 PAC. L.J. 1107 (1984). 
109. People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30 (1932).
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H. Federal Reserved Rights
When the federal government sets aside lands for specific purposes, 
the law implies that sufficient water to accomplish the primary purpose of 
the reservation has been reserved as well.110  This “Winters doctrine” applies to 
groundwater withdrawals.  In Capppaert v. United States,111 a national 
monument had been set aside to preserve a pond harboring the desert 
pupfish.  Nearby farmers were pumping groundwater pursuant to 
established state water rights.  Finding that the ground and surface waters 
were “ ‘physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle,’ “112 
the court held that the federal water rights, established as of the date of the 
reservation, trumped state rights and the farmers’ pumping should be 
curtailed. 
I. Direct Enforcement
Article 10 section 2 of California’s Constitution subjects all of the 
State’s water to the reasonable and beneficial use standard and prohibits 
waste.  It is self-executing by its own terms.  Legislation implements this 
provision as well.  Both the Department of Water Resources and the SWRCB 
are directed to take “all appropriate proceedings or actions before executive, 
legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste, unreasonable use, 
unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable method of diversion of water 
in this state.”113  Under this provision, the Board may file a civil action to 
contest the reasonableness of a use or diversion of water.114 
In light of the holding in California Trout, that fish and game protective 
statutes are legislative expressions of the public trust prioritizing trust uses, 
it would seem that other such statutory expressions would also be available 
to challenge groundwater diversions that harm trust values.  For instance 
Water Code section 275 is available to the water board to contest waste and 
unreasonable use.  And the Attorney General has broad powers to bring 
environmental actions under her common law and statutory authority.115  The 
underutilized Sax report assumes the availability of relief under the 
110. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
111. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
112. Id. at 142 (quoting C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION, NAT’L WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY NO. 6, xxiv (1971)). 
113. CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West).
114. People v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753 (1976).
115. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12600-12612 (West).
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constitutional reasonable use standard and Water Code section 100, which 
restates that standard in statute form.116 
J. CEQA
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) makes the long-term 
protection of the environment “the guiding criterion in public decisions.”117  
It independently requires an evaluation of the environmental impacts of a 
wide variety of projects.118  It also limits the power of public entities to 
authorize environmentally harmful projects “when an economically feasible 
alternative is available.”119  Recently the California Supreme Court found an 
environmental impact report (“EIR”) insufficient in that it failed to identify 
long-term provisions for water-use development.  The document failed to 
identify “clearly and coherently” how long term water needs would be met, 
the impacts of using identified sources (including groundwater) and how the 
impacts would be mitigated.120 
A good example of CEQA’s impact on water resources is the appellate 
court’s treatment of the city’s efforts to divert surface and groundwater from 
the Owens Valley to Los Angeles some 400 miles away.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the project, which involved expanded groundwater 
pumping, required a full EIR.121  Ruling on a second effort of the city to do an 
acceptable EIR, the court compelled the city to recognize the integration of 
ground and surface waters under its control.122  A third attempt led the court 
to require the city to adopt a water conservation ordinance.  “When the 
state’s water resources dwindle, the constitutional demands grow more 
116. “Assuming that a substantive violation exists, there is no doubt
that the Board, through the Attorney General, can institute litigation to 
control groundwater use that (1) constitutes waste or unreasonable use or 
method of use within the meaning of Article X, § 2 of the California 
Constitution and Water Code § 100; or that violates the public trust.”  SAX, 
supra note 17, at 82 (footnotes omitted).  
117. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West).
118. See e.g., Protect the Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water
Agency, 116 Cal. App. 4th 1099 (2004); Stanislaus Nat’l Heritage Project v. 
Cnty. of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182 (1996).   
119. See Cnty. of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (Inyo III), 71 Cal. App. 3d
185, 193 (1977).  
120. Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of
Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal.4th 412 (2007).  
121. Cnty. of Inyo v. Yorty (Inyo I), 32 Cal. App. 2d 795, 815-16 (1973).
122. Cnty. of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (Inyo II) 61 Cal. App. 3d 91
(1976). 
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stringent and compelling, to the end that scarcity and personal sacrifice be 
shared as widely as possible among the state’s inhabitants.”123 
K. Actions by the Attorney General
The Attorney General may bring an independent action to protect “the 
natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.”124  
Indeed, standing to bring such actions exist independent of statute when 
diversions are injuring fishery resources of the State.125 
L. The Local Planning Process
Any city or county reviewing a project under the California 
Environmental Quality Act must identify any public water system supplying 
water to it and prepare an assessment of the system’s total projected water 
supplies in normal, single dry and multiple dry years over a 20 year period. 
If the water supply includes groundwater, the assessment must review any 
relevant information in any applicable urban water management plan, and 
describe any groundwater basin constituting the source for the project.126  
Once the project reaches the stage of subdivision map approval, the 
adequacy of the water supply must be more specifically evaluated and the 
adequacy of water supplies be certified by the city or county with 
jurisdiction.127 
123. Rossmann, supra note 30, at n. 106 (quoting Preliminary
Memorandum, County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Civ. 13886 (Mar. 24, 
1977)). In another unsuccessful effort, the city’s EIR included all 
groundwater extraction but excluded changes in surface diversions it was 
claimed would accompany the pumping.  Cnty. of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles 
(Inyo IV), 124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-8 (1981).    
124. “Natural resource” is defined to include water, wildlife, aesthetic
sites and “any other natural resource which, irrespective of ownership 
contributes, or in the future may contribute, to the health, safety, welfare, or 
enjoyment of a substantial number of persons, or to the substantial balance 
of an ecological community.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12605 (West). 
125. See People v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 127 Cal. App. 30
(1932). 
126. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10631(b), 10910(f) (West).
127. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66473.7 (West); see also Vineyard Area Citizens
for Responsible Growth, Inc.v. City of Ranch Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412 at 433-
34 (2007) (explaining how CEQA is affected by these requirements). 
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M. Injunctive Action
California Water Code section 275 authorizes the Department of Water 
Resources and the State Water Board to take “all appropriate proceedings” 
to prevent waste on unreasonable use or diversion, method of use, or 
diversions before executive, legislative or judicial agencies.  
VII. Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits
In an insightful essay, California Chief Justice Roger Traynor noted the
challenge courts face in determining how “to synchronize the unguided 
missiles launched by legislatures with a going system of common law.”128  
His observations are particularly applicable in the context of water law 
where the principles of nuisance and public trust often are found in codified 
statutes.  In California Trout, Inc. v, State Water Resources Control Board129 the court 
construed a statute requiring that sufficient water be provided below dams 
to keep fish in good condition as a public trust rule defining the public 
interest in fisheries.  Such a statute, the court held, was a legislative policy 
choice of the values served, to be upheld unless it was unreasonable.130  As a 
result, the City of Los Angeles as dam owner could not assert the statute of 
limitations as a defense because “[a]n encroachment on the public trust 
interest . . . cannot ripen into a contrary right . . . .”131  The public trust nature 
of a statute has other important ramifications.  Since the trust is a 
preexisting interest in property held for the people, restrictions on its use 
are not subject to inverse condemnation claims.132 
Statutes may implement common law trust duties by spelling out the 
public trust obligation of the state to plan comprehensively for water use.133  
For instance, the Department of Water Resources is authorized to conduct 
investigations of the state’s water resources and formulate plans for their 
“control, conservation, protection, and utilization.”134 
128. Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.
L. REV. 401, 402 (1968) (reprinted in The Traynor Reader, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 156
(1987).
129. 207 Cal. App. 3d 585 (1989).
130. Id, at 625.
131. Id. at 631.
132. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 439-40 (1983); see also Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009-10 (2002) (discussing lower court 
holding that private property with a public resource may be constrained 
without compensation). 
133. See United Plainsmen v N.D. State Water Conservation Comm’n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).  
134. CAL. WATER CODE § 12616 (West).
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The National Audubon decision notes that the power of the Water Board 
“has steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities between 
competing appropriators to the charge of comprehensive planning and 
allocation of waters.”135  It observed that the board could prohibit diversions 
by the owner of a prescriptive water right that refused to comply with water 
conservation measures even though there was no license involved which the board 
could revoke or condition.136  The board powers, the court said, “rested on 
the legislative intent ‘to vest in the board expansive powers to safeguard the 
scarce water resources of the state.’”137  Other statutory expressions may 
constitute public trust exercises as well.  Most recently, California Water 
Code section 85023 gives new emphasis to the importance of these rules, 
and new support to their implementation.  It states: “The longstanding 
constitutional principle of reasonable use and the public trust doctrine shall be the 
foundation of state water management policy . . . .”138   
There is a danger, however, that a statute may be construed as 
encompassing all of the trust values when it does not.  For instance, in a 
proceeding involving the Salton Sea the SWRCB found it unnecessary to 
consider independent public trust arguments because California Water Code 
section 1736, providing that the board may approve long term transfers if 
the change “would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream 
beneficial uses,” covered the field.139  Of course the public trust covers more 
than instream beneficial uses.  Its protections extend to such things as the 
protection of lands “in their natural state, so they may serve as ecological 
units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide 
food and habitat for birds or marine life, and which favorably affect the 
scenery and climate of the area.”140  The board’s reliance on the somewhat 
limited scope of section 1736 here would seem misguided. 
In another curious twist, the California Supreme Court construed trust-
like statutory declarations accompanied by restrictive language as indicating 
legislative intent that a particular trust application should be limited to the 
terms of the statute.  It declined to entertain arguments that the common 
law trust in wildlife would be violated by certain logging practices on the 
ground that compliance with an express statutory scheme was sufficient. 
Statutes declaring state policy and conferring the duty to protect and 
conserve wildlife on the State Department of Fish and Game disavowed any 
135. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 444.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. (quoting People v. Shirikow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309 (1980)).
138. CAL. WATER CODE § 85023 (West) (emphasis added).
139. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., STATE OF CAL., REVISED ORDER WR
2002-13 at 19, n. 5 (2002). 
140. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 434-35.
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attempt to regulate those resources except as specifically authorized by 
legislation, the court stated.141  This construction appears to be inconsistent 
with the court’s earlier rejection of the suggestion that the statutory 
appropriative rights system had “subsumed” the public trust doctrine.  At 
that time, in regards to statutes codifying the duty of the water board to 
consider public trust uses of stream water, the court stated: 
These enactments do not render the judicially fashioned public 
trust doctrine superfluous.  Aside from the possibility that 
statutory protections can be repealed, the noncodified public 
trust doctrine remains important both to confirm the state’s 
sovereign supervision and to require consideration of public 
trust uses in cases filed directly in the courts without prior 
proceedings before the board.142   
This treatment of statutory provisions seems more consistent with the 
restrictions on alienability set forth in Illinois Central and California decisions 
noting the trust’s base in constitutional law.143  
Although the legislature has the power to prioritize trust uses on 
behalf of the people,144 legislative efforts to limit its scope have been 
frowned upon.  Illinois Central, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held the 
Illinois legislature was powerless to extinguish the trust on Chicago’s 
waterfront, is perhaps the leading example but many others exist.  Thus in 
1896 the Wisconsin court struck down legislation authorizing the draining of 
a lake, holding that “the state is powerless to divest itself of its trusteeship 
as to the submerged lands under navigable waters in this state,” even for a 
purportedly public purpose.145   
The legislature has no more authority to emancipate itself from 
the obligation resting upon it which was assumed at the 
commencement of its statehood, to preserve for the benefit of all 
the people forever the enjoyment of the navigable waters within 
its boundaries, than it has to donate the school fund or the state 
capitol for a private purpose.  It is supposed that this doctrine 
141. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr.v. Cal. Dept. of Forestry, 44 Cal. 4th 459, 515
(2008) (citing Cal. Fish & Game Code § 1801). 
142. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 446 n. 27.
143. E.g., People ex. rel. v. El Dorado Cnty., 96 Cal. App. 3d 403 (1980).
144. E,g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148 (1928); see generally, Stevens,
supra note 8, at 223-25. 
145. Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 79 N.W. 780, 781
(1899). 
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has been so firmly rooted in our jurisprudence as to be safe from 
any assault that can be made upon it.146   
In later years, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated legislation purporting 
to abrogate the public trust with regard to water rights.147  The public trust 
doctrine, the court held, is a “constitutional limitation on legislative power 
to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people.”148  And the 
validity of Idaho legislation aimed at making the public trust inapplicable to 
water rights has been questioned by legal scholars.149 
VIII. The State Constitution and the Public Trust: Self-
Executing Remedies
In California law, two powerful and as yet under-utilized doctrines have
the potential to protect the state’s dwindling groundwater resource: 1) the 
constitutional mandates that water be put to reasonable and beneficial use, 
that waste be avoided and the people’s right of access to navigable waters 
be maintained, and 2) the public trust.  They have the potential for remedial 
actions in cases in which, like Mono Lake, the Lower American River and 
Putah Creek, the ordinary regulatory scheme has failed, without imposing 
the formal extra layer of controls that has been anathema for local 
governments and legislators.   
146. Id. at 781.
147. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct., 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999);
Sean E. O’Day, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court: Rejecting Legislative 
Favoritism in Water Right Allocations 4 U. DENV. W. L. REV. 29, 63 (2000).  
148. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 199 (Ariz. 1999).
149. M. Bloom, H. Dunning. S. Reed, Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine:
An Assessment of the Validity of House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L. REV. 461 (1997).  See 
also, J. Kearney, Closing the Floodgates?  Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91, 122-123 (1997) (contending legislature 
cannot abrogate trust because it is an attribute of sovereignty.  A number of 
western state courts other than Arizona and California, have also held that 
the public trust has constitutional roots in provisions declaring the public 
interest in waters and natural resources); see CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 
P.2d 1115 (AK 1988); In re Water Use Application (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d
409 (Hawaii 2000); Galt v. Mont. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 731 P.2d
912 (Mont. 1987); United Plainsmen Ass’n v. N.D. State Water Comm’n., 247
N.W. 2d 457 (N.D. 1976); Rettkowski v. Dept. of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232 (Wash.
1993).
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A. The State Constitution
Paramount is the constitutional mandate that all uses of water are 
subject to the requirements of reasonable and beneficial use.150  It applies to 
all the water of the state, including groundwater.151  The State’s Supreme 
Court has declared that determining what constitutes a reasonable and 
beneficial use depends on each case, stating “such inquiry cannot be 
resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of transcendent 
importance.  Paramount among [this determination is] the ever increasing 
need for conservation of water in this state.”152  As Justice John Racanelli 
stated in an oft-cited opinion: “all water rights are subject to the overriding 
constitutional limitation that water use must be reasonable.”153  Additionally 
of course the provisions of Article 10 section 4 guaranteeing access to 
navigable waters provide further grounds for action against diverters whose 
actions deprive the people of those rights by drying up the waterways.154 
150. In 1928, the California Constitution was amended to require that
all the state’s water be put to reasonable and beneficial use: “It is hereby 
declared that because of conditions prevailing in this State the general 
welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial 
use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or 
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the 
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable 
and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public 
welfare.   The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any 
natural stream or water course in the State is and shall be limited to such 
water as s hall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, 
and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable 
use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of 
water . . . . This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may also 
enact laws in furtherance of the policy in this section contained.”  CAL.
CONST., art. X, § 2.   
151. “All uses of water, including public trust uses, must now conform
to the standard of reasonable use.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 
3d 419, 443 (1983); see also Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (1935). 
152. Joplin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140 (1967).
153. U.S. v. St. Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 150 (1986);
Ronald B. Robie, The Delta Decision: The Quiet Revolution in Water Rights, 19 PAC. 
L.J. 1111 (1988).
154. See, People ex. rel. v. El Dorado Cnty., 96 Cal. App. 3d 403 (1980);
see also PG&E v. Super. Ct. Shasta Cnty., 145 Cal. App. 3d 253 (1983). 
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B. The California Constitution Provides Several Bases for
Action
Article 10, section 2 is an exercise of state police power to protect the 
public interest in water.155  And section 4 restates the public trust rights in 
navigable waters.  The police power expressed in these provisions can be 
exercised in several different ways: 
1. Directly
The California Constitution directly provides an action to enforce the 
reasonable use standard or to prevent waste or to enforce trust duties. 
Article 10, section 2 is self-executing by its own terms, and expressly permits 
the enactment of laws in furtherance of its policy.  The legislature has 
defined the use of water for recreation and preservation of fish and wildlife 
resources as a beneficial use of water, and the appellate court has held that 
its determination must be upheld unless it is unreasonable.156  Water Code 
section 275 authorizes the State Water Resources Control Board to take “all 
appropriate action” to prevent waste or unreasonable use, and Government 
Code section 12600 authorizes the Attorney General to bring actions 
independently to protect the environment.  The courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over public trust actions.157  The California Supreme court 
construed the board’s powers broadly, stating in National Audubon that its 
power to act “has steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities 
between competing appropriators to the charge of comprehensive planning 
and allocation of values.”158  In another case it upheld the board’s power to 
stop diversions even in the absence of a permit or license, based on 
legislative intent “to vest in the board expansive powers to safeguard the 
scarce water resources of the state.”159 
Article 10, section 4 provides an additional basis for protection.  It 
provides in part:  
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or in 
possession of the frontage or title lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, 
estuary or other navigable water in this state, shall be permitted to 
exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for 
any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such 
155. Gin Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673 (1933).
156. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West); Ca. Trout, Inc. v, State Water Res.
Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 585 (1989). 
157. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, 448-51 (1983).
158. Id. at 444.
159. Id. (quoting People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309 (1980)).
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water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the 
most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the 
navigable waters of this state shall be always obtainable for the 
people thereof.160  
Under the rationale of National Audubon, diversions affecting access to and 
navigation over navigable waters could violate this provision.   
2. The Public Trust
The National Audubon decision integrated the reasonable use rule with 
the public trust doctrine and made it clear that even long continued uses are 
subject to modification if changing conditions call for it.  It reaffirmed the 
power of the state to reexamine existing water uses to preserve sufficient 
water to protect public trust uses.161  Thus, two converging remedies, 
reconciled by the court, gave new focus and force to overriding objectives. 
Independently of the statutory water rights system, the court stated, “[t]he 
state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the 
planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses 
whenever feasible.”162  
C. Permit Conditions Can Implement the Constitutional and
Trust Mandates
The State Water Board may impose stream flow requirements to 
protect fish and wildlife as conditions to water permits and licenses.163  Of 
course this presupposes in the case of groundwater that the waters in 
question qualify as subterranean streams.  The legislature has thus far 
declined to amend the permit statutes, and the Water Board has declined to 
extend its jurisdiction to them, despite the many arguments made to justify 
it. 
Thus, under both the constitutional reasonable use rule and the public 
trust, the uses of water are subject to continuous scrutiny in light of 
changing conditions.  If the public trust subjects diversions from the non-
navigable tributaries of navigable waters to continuing scrutiny and possible 
modification in light of changing conditions, the same reasoning should 
160. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (emphasis added).
161. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 439-40.
162. Id. at 446.
163. CAL. WATER CODE  § 1257.5 (West).  The Board must consider
stream flow requirements prepared by the Director of Fish and Game, who 
may also propose modifications of Board requirements.   
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apply to groundwater extractions having similar negative effects.164  Indeed, 
the court has already treated the trust as applicable to riparian rights on 
federal reserved lands.165  And it has linked the origins of the watery trust to 
the equal footing doctrine under which the later admitted states acquired 
their navigable waters subject to the same trust as the original colonies.166  
This decision suggests that the trust applies to all water rights.  A recent 
decision from Hawaii’s highest court reaches the same conclusion.167 
IX. Past and Present Trust Applications
In light of the sweeping compass and rationale of National Audubon, it
seems likely that the public trust will apply to withdrawals of groundwater 
demonstrably affecting surface waters.  This point may soon be clarified in 
the pending litigation over the Scott River.  Meanwhile, several courts have 
successfully applied public trust and reasonable use rules.   
A. Mono Lake
After the Supreme Court’s National Audubon decision, the Mono Lake 
case went back to superior court, where El Dorado Superior Court Judge 
Terrence Finney held months long hearings over whether to enjoin the City 
of Los Angeles from diverting further water.  He eventually issued a 
judgment setting interim levels for the lake and restraining the city from 
making withdrawals that would lower them pending a conclusive water 
rights proceeding by the water board.168   
B. The Lower American River
Proposed diversions by the East Bay Municipal Utility District 
(EBMUD) reached the Alameda County Superior Court after nearly 20 years 
of litigation.  Judge Richard Hodge eventually imposed a physical solution, 
conditioning any withdrawals on standards designed to protect trust 
164. But see Santa Theresa Citizens Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 114
Cal. App. 4th 689, 709 (2003) (suggesting in dicta that the public trust has 
“no direct effect on groundwater resources.”).  
165. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. U.S., 44 Cal. 3d 448, 472, n.16
(1988). 
166. Id.
167. In re Water Use Application (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 (Hawaii
2000). 
168. In the Matter of Mono Lake Water Rights Cases, El Dorado Cnty.
Super. Ct., Coordinated Proceeding Nos. 2284 and 2288 (Jun. 14, 1990 and 
Apr. 17, 1991). 
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values.169  Judge Hodge’s opinion disposed of a number of efforts to limit the 
trust 
1. Whether the Legislature modified the trust in approving the
Folsom South Canal, a diversion facility (it did not);
2. Whether the trust applies to water contractors not water rights
holders (it does);
3. Whether a physical solution may be applied to restrict
diversions (it may).  The imposed flows conflict with public trust
needs and reasonable use.170
C. Putah Creek
A bitter dispute among water agencies, cities, and the University of 
California was adjudicated by Sacramento Superior Court Judge Richard 
Park, who imposed public trust standards on withdrawals.  The Putah Creek 
case involved a standoff between urban and agricultural uses and concerns 
over what Judge Park described as a “treasure,” home for birds, wildlife, fish 
and riparian vegetation.171  The court concluded that existing releases were 
insufficient to protect the creek’s trust values or to keep fish in good 
condition as required by Fish and Game Code section 5937.172  In passing, he 
laid to rest the argument that in the context of water rights the public trust 
did not apply to rancho lands.173  Judge Park laid to rest several issues: 
1. Whether a water must be commercially navigable to receive trust
protection.  Here Judge Park’s answer was “In my view present day issues 
ought not to be driven by such an archaic, if not arcane, principle having 
nothing whatsoever to do with the proper allocation of water.”174 
2. Whether the diverters should be reimbursed for lost water.  This
argument is based on a traditional public trust principle: if the state 
exercises the trust to retake trust land occupied by others, the ousted 
occupants should be reimbursed for lawful improvements.175  However this 
169. Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v, East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., Alameda
Cnty. Super. Ct., No. 425955 (Jan. 2, 1990). 
170. Id.
171. Reporter’s Transcript of Judge’s Ruling, Putah Creek Water Cases
Judicial Council No. 2565 (Sacramento County Superior Court filed Apr. 8, 
1996). 
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 13.
174. Id. at 19-20.
175. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892).
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rule is inapplicable to modifications in water rights compelled by either 
trust or reasonable use principles.176   
D. Litigation Pending
Still pending litigation focuses on a major issue: the applicability of 
National Audubon to groundwater diversions affecting navigable streams: 
Environmental and fishery organizations have brought suit against 
Siskiyou County alleging a failure to manage groundwater sources 
interconnected with the Scott River in a manner consistent with the public 
trust doctrine.177  In 1980 the Scott River underwent a water rights 
adjudication in which the water board determined rights to water of the 
River’s “stream system.”178  Although a stream system generally does not 
include groundwater, in this case it was found to include “groundwater 
supplies which are interconnected with the Scott River, but. . .not any other 
underground water supply.”179 
Petitioners in the Scott River litigation claim that excess and 
unchecked extractions of groundwater interconnected with the Scott River is 
causing a decrease in the river flow, which in turn leads to diminishing fish 
populations.180  They contend that “interconnected groundwater” that feeds 
into the Scott River is analogous to the water in the tributaries that fed 
Mono Lake in National Audubon Society and therefore the county has a duty 
to take the public trust doctrine into account when managing the use of this 
groundwater.181  They ask that the county be prohibited from issuing or 
renewing groundwater extraction permits or well drilling permits within the 
Scott River sub-basin “until such time as they are not in violation of their 
public trust duties.”182   
X. Conclusion
California’s dubious statutory distinctions between ground and surface
waters have become more attenuated in light of new advances in measuring 
176. Nat’l Audubon, supra note 60, at 440.
177. Envtl. Law Found. et al. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.
34-2010-80000538 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).
178. Scott River Adjudication, Decree No. 30662, Superior Court for
Siskiyou County (Jan. 30, 1980). 
179. Id.; see also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2501, 2501.5 (West).
180. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint, Environmental
Law Institute et al v. State Water Resources Control Board, Sacramento 
County Superior Court No. 34-2010-80000583 filed June 23, 2010. 
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id. at 13.
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their relationship.183  Groundwater, like all the other waters of the state, is 
imbued with a state interest.  Numerous declarations in constitution and 
statute define this interest.  The California Constitution calls on the 
legislature to implement the requirement that water be reasonably used, 
and courts have made it clear that such enactments will be upheld so long 
as they are not “manifestly unreasonable.”184  Nevertheless, the courts have 
on the whole been much readier to define and exercise this interest than has 
the Legislature.  
National Audubon makes it clear that courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
over public trust actions, and the Shirikow decision permits reasonable use 
challenges without regard to the statutory permit system.  It appears that 
the judiciary is in a valuable position to safeguard the public interest in 
those trust and reasonable use disputes that the specialized agencies were 
unable to cope with.  The most significant post-National Audubon decisions 
were made by trial courts, and it is a tribute to the system that they were not 
appealed.185   
These examples suggest that concurrent jurisdiction works, and 
provides a remedy without extending the statutory jurisdiction of state 
agencies.  Is it the final answer?  Arguments can be made for the utilization 
of more expertise at the state level in such oft complex issues, and for a 
centralized administrative decision making progress to avoid the vagaries of 
individual jurists.  But as the high court observed, water judgments cannot 
be made in vacuo.  Each case must be decided in light of current 
circumstances and changing needs, in recognition that in water law 
everything is in the process of changing.  “The time is long past for 
comprehensive groundwater regulation in California.  The failure . . . to act 
will not make the problem disappear.”186 
183. “[E]ach new study that confirms the connection between water
underground and water on the surface gives a little more ammunition to 
environmental groups, legislators and water lawyers who want to bring 
groundwater under unambiguous state control, as it is in every other state 
except Texas.”  Felicity Barringer, Blog, Psst...Groundwater and Surface Water Do 
Mix, NY TIMES BLOG  (Feb. 3, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/ 
03/psst-groundwater-and-surface-water-do-mix/. 
184. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 351-352
(1979); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. St. Water Res. Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d. 585, 
625 (1989).  
185. The Putah Creek case was appealed but settled before it was
argued.  Settlement Reached in Long-running Putah Creek Water Dispute, U.C. DAVIS
NEWS (May 24, 2000), http://news.ucdavis.edu/search/news_detail.lasso? 
id=5115. 
186. E. Garner, M. Ouelette, R. Sheraff, Institutional Reform in California
Groundwater Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021-1022 (1994).  
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The public trust and the constitutional water mandates, integrated by 
National Audubon, may have the synergy to breathe new life into statutes of 
previously limited scope.  Just as the Fish and Game Code provisions 
protecting fish were construed to be public trust exercises, provisions such 
as Water Code section 275 and Government Code section 12607 may be 
construed to authorize the Water Board and Attorney General to bring 
actions to implement the trust and the expressly self-executing reasonable 
use provisions of Article 10, section 2.  The water board was established to 
“exercise the adjudicatory and regulatory functions of the state in the field of 
water resources.”187  National Audubon holds that the Water Board must take 
trust interests into account in the planning and allocation of water 
resources.  The Board’s jurisdiction in that regard is not limited to waters 
over which it has permit authority.188  Notwithstanding permits, the courts 
have long protected surface stream rights against groundwater pumping and 
vice versa.189 
The road to management of groundwater as a trust resource has 
constitutional support.  The related reasonable use and public access 
guarantees of Article 10 have been cited by the court as a basis for a public 
trust in waters.190  Although the Legislature usually sets trust priorities, the 
California Constitution sets forth a choice made directly by the people who 
are beneficiaries of the trust.  In the words of the Supreme Court’s 
construction of the allied provisions of Article 10, they “are binding upon 
every department of the state government, legislative, executive, and 
judicial . . . .  All previous laws inconsistent therewith ceased to be effective 
upon the adoption thereof.”191  The Constitution sets forth an irrefutable 
mandate for the waters of the state. 
The public interest at issue is inescapable.  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes stated:  
Few public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and 
independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of 
a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it 
substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as 
the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the purpose of 
turning them to a more perfect use.  The public interest is omni 
187. CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West).
188. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225
Cal. App. 3d 548, 573 (1990) (holding that the Board has jurisdiction over 
unlicensed pre-1914 appropriations). 
189. See SAX, supra note 17, at 87-89.
190. People ex. rel. v. El Dorado Cnty., 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 407 (1980).
191. People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 587-88 (1913).
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present wherever there is a state, and grows more pressing as 
population grows.  It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that 
the private property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed 
to have deeper roots . . . .  The private right to appropriate is 
subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial 
limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great 
foundations of public welfare and health.192 
The law permits, or perhaps mandates, active and integrated 
groundwater management.  The basis for applying the public trust, to the 
impact on navigable waters by diversions from their sources, is as applicable 
to groundwater as it is to the surface tributaries of navigable streams. 
Whether the harm to fish, riparian habitat, and related resources taxed by 
dwindling streams is attributable to groundwater pumping or surface water 
diversions makes little difference to the innocent fish, trees, and vegetation 
dependent on these waters.  If California’s resounding constitutional, 
statutory, and common law guarantees are to be met, it will require the 
recognition that our water resources are related and must be so recognized. 
192. Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
